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They aH lauded at Wilbur and his brother,
}A^en they said that man could Jly.
They told Marconi wireless was a phony;
It's the same old cry.
—IRA GERSHWIN
WHY DO WE MAKE ERRORS? ARE THEY BLUNDERS CAUSED BY THE
limitations of our cognitive system? Or are errors indispensable parts
of every intelligent system? From the first perspective, all errors are at
best unnecessary and at worst harmful. Consider an error commonly
made by children. When asked to find the sum of 1/2 and 1/3. the answer
is often 2/5. This is called the freshman error of adding numerators and
adding denominators {Silver. 1986). But blunders are not limited to chil-
dren. After the invention of the telephone, a group of British experts
concluded that this invention had no practical value, at least in their
country: "The telephone may be appropriate for our American cousins,
but not here, because we have an adequate supply of messenger boys"
{Sherden. 1998: 175). In 1961. President John F. Kennedy is reported to
have asked himself "How could I have been so stupid?" after realizing
how badly he had miscalculated when he approved the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion planned by the CIA (Janis and Mann. 1977: xv). Blunders like these
seem to be unnecessary as well as embarrassing, and every intelligent
system would work better without them. In this view, to err is not to
think.
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made—that is. errors that are indispensable and functional. I call these
"good" errors. Children are known for good errors. Consider a 3-year-old
who uses the phrase "I gived" instead of "I gave." A child cannot know
in advance which verbs are irregular; because irregular verbs are rare,
the child's best bet is to assume the regular form until proved wrong.
The error is "good"—that is. useful—because if the 3-year-old did not
try out new forms and occasionally make errors, but instead played it
safe and used only those words it had already heard, she would learn a
language at a very slow rate. The characteristic of a good error is that a
person is better off making the error than not making it—for reaching
a goal more quickly, or attaining it at all. In this view, every intelligent
system has to make errors. Making no errors would destroy the intel-
ligence of the system. There is a close parallel to Darwinian theory,
where random variability and mutation—copying errors—are essential
for evolution by natural selection. Not making these errors would elim-
inate evolution. Trial-and-error learning, at the ontogenetic or evolu-
tionary level, is one source of good errors in an uncertain world.
In this article, I deal with the study of human errors in experi-
mental psychology. The problem that researchers try to resolve is this:
How can one infer the laws of cognition—of perception, memory, and
thought? One answer is to study the systematic errors people make.
At first glance, this program looks like a straightforward extension of
Francis Bacon's plan for studying nature's errors, or of Freud's strategy
to analyze repressed memories, slips of tongue, and abnormal neurotic
behavior. The idea is to catch nature when it does not pay attention—
creating strange facts such as blood rain in Bavaria and an Irish girl with
several horns growing on her body (Daston and Park, 1998). However,
there is an important difference. We can easily see what is wrong with
a goat with two heads or a man with obsess ive<ompulsive hand wash-
ing, and understand that it is not to the benefit of the animal or the
human. Cognitive errors, however, are not as clear, as we will soon see.
Here, one has to define rather than simply observe what an error of
judgment is. In this article. I argue: • .
196 social researchFig. 1. Perceptual Illusion of "pop-out" dots. If you turn the page around,
the inward dots wiil pop out and vice versa. The right picture is identical to
the left rotated by 180 degrees. From Kleffner and Ramachandran (1992);
reprinted by permission of Psychonomfc Society, Inc.
1. The study of cognitive errors has been dominated by a logical defi-
nition of errors. But this narrow norm tends to mistake forms of
human intelligence that go beyond logic for stupid blunders, and
consequently fails to unravel the laws of mind.
2. An ecological analysis, in place of a logical one, instead reveals the
existence of good errors, which open a window into the mind. The
prototype of an ecological analysis is the study of visual illusions.
The method I use in this article is to document both points by
illustrative examples.
.*'
VISUAL ILLUSIONS
Let us first see what a visual illusion is. and what one can learn from it.
Consider the dots on the left-hand side of figure 1. They appear concave,
receding into the surface away from the observer. The dots on the right
side, however, appear convex: they project up fi-om the surface, extend-
ing toward the observer. When you tum the page upside-down, the
concave dots will tum into convex dots, and vice versa. But there is
no third dimension, and there are no convex and concave dots. Seeing
things that systematically deviate from the relevant physical measure-
ments is called a perceptual illusion.
What can we leam from this illusion about how our brain works?
First, that the world, fi-om the perspective of our mind, is fundamen-
tally uncertain. Our brain does not have sufficient infonnation to know
for certain what is out there, but it is not paralyzed by uncertainty.
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based on the structure of its environment, or what it assumes the struc-
ture to be. The brain assumes a three-dimensional world and uses the
shaded parts of the dots to guess in what direction of the third dimen-
sion they extend. By experimentally varying factors such as the loca-
tion of the light source and the shading, and documenting their effect
on the illusion, Kleffner and Ramachandran (1992) concluded that the
assumed ecological structures are that
1. light comes from above {in relation to retinal coordinates), and
2. there is only one source of light
These structures describe human (and mammalian) history,
where the sun and moon were the only sources of light, and only one
operated at a time. The first regularity also holds approximately for
artificial light today, which is typically placed above us. such as street
lamps (although there are exceptions, such as car lights). The brain
exploits these assumed structures by using a fast and frugal heuristic:
If the shade is in the upper part, then the dots are concave; if the shade is in the
lower part, then the dots are convex.
Shading is phylogenetically one of the most primitive cues, and
so is the principle of countershading that conceals animals' shapes
from predators, as in the pale bellies of swarm fishes that neutralize
the effects of the sun shining fi-om above. Helmholtz (1962 [1856-1866])
used the term "unconscious inferences" for this type of heuristic, and
he and his followers (e.g., Brunswik, 1934) thought that the cues were
leamed fi-om individual experience; others have favored evolutionary
leaming (e.g.. Shepard. 1987). The systematic study of this perceptual
illusion has led to various insights and speculations about the mech-
anism of perception. These include that for the brain, "from above"
means relative to retinal coordinates, not relative to the horizon or
gravity, and that our brains seem to make the "default" assumption
that objects are more likely to be convex rather than concave (Deutsch
and Ramachandran. 1990). ' f" '
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of a highly intelligent "betting" machine (Gregory. 1974). Therefore,
a perceptual system that does not make any errors would not be an
intelligent system. It would report oniy what the eye can "see." That
would be both too little and too much. Too little because perception
must go beyond the information given, since it has to abstract and
generalize. Too much because a "veridical" system would overwhelm
the mind with a vast amount of irrelevant details. Perceptual errors.
therefore, are a necessary part, or by-product, of an intelligent system.
They exemplify a second source of good errors: visual illusions result
fTom "bets" that are virtually incorrigible, whereas the "bets" in trial-
and-error leaming are made in order to be eventually corrected. Both
kinds of gambles are indispensable and complementary tools of an
intelligent mind.
The case of visual illusions illustrates the general proposition
that every intelligent system makes good errors; otherwise it would not
be intelligent. The reason is that the outside world is uncertain, and the
system has to make intelligent inferences based on assumed ecological
structures. Going beyond the information given by making inferences
Vkdll produce systematic errors. Not making these errors would destroy
intelligence. . •• . "
I. LOGIC AND BLUNDERS
Unlike in theories of perception, errors in the social sciences are
typically seen as annoyances. The nuisance comes in many forms,
such as observational and measurement error; statistical techniques
are employed to tame the error and extract the true values from all
the noise. Economics, for instance, has long tried to ignore errors of
measurement, possibly because of "the absence of any good cure for
this disease" (Griliches. 1974: 975). The same negative attitude toward
errors has shaped the program of stud3ring ertors of judgment, which
emerged in the 1960s (Edwards. 1968; Wason, 1966). It became widely
known through the heuristics-and-biases program (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). invaded social psychology (Nisbett and Ross. 1980).
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(Camerer, 1995) as well as that of behavioral law and economics in the
1990s (Sunstein, 2000). Hundreds of studies have tried to document
people's blunders in almost all domains of life: fiawed intuitive notions
of chance, the faulty intuitions of basketball coaches, patients' illogical
judgments of pain, and people's moral errors. Oddly, the new program
of studying useless errors was introduced in analogy to errors in percep-
tion, specifically visual illusions.
Kahneman and Tversky argued that one can determine an error
in judgment exactly like one in perception by using logic rather than
physical measurement as the norm. "The presence of an error of judg-
ment is demonstrated by comparing people's responses either with an
established fact (e.g., that the two lines are equal in length) or with an
accepted rule of arithmetic, logic, or statistics" (Kahneman and Tversky.
1982:123). Just as perceptual errors help to discover the laws of percep-
tion, errors of judgment help to discover the laws of higher-order cogni-
tion, Tversky and Kahneman (1983: 313) asserted.
Psychologists were not the first to draw a parallel between percep-
tual and judgmental errors. In his chapter on illusion in probability
estimation, Pierre Simon Laplace (1814) wrote that "the mind has its
illusions, like the sense of vision" (182). Yet before the 1950s and l%Os,
few psychologists thought that logic or probability theory could reveal
the laws of mind. On the contraiy, Wilhelm Wundt (1973 [1912]), known
as the father of experimental psychology, concluded that logical norms
have little to do with thought processes, and that attempts to apply them
to learn about psychological processes have been absolutely fruitless.
The new focus on logic and probability was part of a larger move-
ment. It occurred after inferential statistics was institutionalized in the
social sciences during the 1950s (Gigerenzer et al., 1989), the revival of
Bayesian statistics (Savage, 1954), and the emergence of theories that
assumed logical structures as the basis of psychological processes (e.g.,
Piaget and Inhelder, 1975 [1951]).
Despite virulent disagreements with the experimental demon-
strations of errors of judgment, Kahneman and Tversky's first major
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ogy with perceptual illusions and even introduced a new fashionable
term, describing errors of judgment "as cognitive illusions ... to invoke
the analogy with visual illusions" (324). But what exactly does the anal-
ogy entail? An answer is strikingly absent in the literature. Recall that
visual illusions are commonly understood as "good" errors, whereas
errors of judgment are virtually always presented as disturbing fallacies
that should have not occurred in the first place and often suggested
to be the cause of many a human disaster. Given this discrepancy, the
content of the analogy is less than obvious. Its function, however seems
clear: the analogy served to persuade the scientific community that the
laws of logic and probability were an uncontroversial norm for good
thinking, just like physical measurements, and that deviations would
help to unravel the laws of thought.
In what follows, I will first argue that logic failed on both goals:
to define errors of judgment and to open a window into the human
mind. I illustrate this argument with two logical principles, set inclu-
sion and invariance. In the second part, I will argue that the analogy
with visual illusions is actually the more promising program in reach-
ing both goals: Kahneman, Tversky, and their followers were right in
proposing the analogy, but they did not follow through on their origi-
nal proposal
Set Inclusion
In their book The Early Growth ofLo^z in the Child, Barbel Inhelder and Jean
Piaget (1964 [1959): 101) reported an experiment in which they showed
5- to 10-year-old children pictures, of which 16 were fiowers and 8 of
these 16 fiowers were primulas. The children were asked a list of ques-
tions about class inclusion relations, one of which was: "Are there more
fiowers or more primulas"? Only 47 percent of the 5- to 7-year-olds gave
answers in accord with class inclusion—that is, that refiected an under-
standing that the flowers were more numerous because they included
the primulas as a subset. Among 8-year-olds, however, a majority (82
percent) gave responses consistent with class inclusion. Later studies
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the onset of class-inclusion reasoning may occur one or two years later
(Reyna, 1991). Inhelder and Piaget concluded that "this kind of think-
ing is not peculiar to professional logicians since the children them-
selves apply it with confidence when they reach the operational level"
(117). The facts seemed to be settled: the adolescent and adult mind is
an "intuitive logician."
Without reference to this earlier work, TVersky and Kahneman
(1983) reached the opposite conclusion. They referred to set inclusion
problems as "conjunction problems." Gonsider the Linda problem:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She
majored in philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with
issues of discrimination and sodal justice, and also participated in anti-
nuclear demonstrations.
Which of two alternatives is more probable:
' • " -.1 •'
Linda is a bank teller,
Unda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement?
The majority of undergraduates (85 percent) chose the second
alternative. Tversky and Kahneman argued that this is an error of judg-
ment, the "conjunction fallacy," because it violates logic. "Like it or not.
A camiot be less probable than (A and B), and a belief to the contraiy is
fallacious. Our problem is to retain what is useful and valid in intuitive
judgment while correcting the errors and biases to which it is prone"
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1982: 98). Numerous experiments replicated
this result. The facts seemed to be, once again, settled, although in
the opposite direction: the adult mind is not at all an intuitive logi-
cian. The conjunction fallacy was interpreted as a potential cause of
general irrationality. "[A] system of judgments that does not obey the
conjunction rule cannot be expected to obey more complicated prin-
ciples that presuppose this rule, such as Bayesian updating, external
calibration, and the maximization of expected utility" (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1983: 313). The error was afterward invoked to explain
202 social researchvarious economic and societal problems, including John Q, Public's
unreasonable fear of technological risks such as nuclear reactor fail-
ures (Stich, 1985), his questionable spending on insurance (Johnson,
Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther, 1993), and major blunders in US
security policy (Kanwisher, 1989). Stephen J. Gould (1992:469) wrote:
I am particularly fond of [the Linda] example, because I
know that the [conjunction) is least probable, yet a little
homunculus in my head continues to jump up and down,
shouting at me, "but she can't just be a bank teller: read the
description.".., Why do we consistently make this simple
logical error? Tversky and Kahneman argue, correctly I
think, that our minds are not built (for whatever reason) to
work by the rules of probability.
But why. we must ask, would 8-year-old children in Geneva not
make this simple logical error, whereas American undergraduates
consistently do? I argue that the irrationality is not to be found in adult
reasoning but in the logical norm. Gonsider what the norm is: the prob-
ability of an event A is larger than (or equal to) the probability of the
events A and B, that is, p(A) > P(AAB). This conjunction rule is used as a
content-blind norm for judgment: the content of the As and Bs is not
considered relevant to evaluating good reasoning. All that counts is the
mathematical probability p and the logical '^ and correct judgment is
attested when people use the English terms probable and and in this and
only this way. This amounts to a purely syntactic definition of rational
reasoning, and therefore, of an error in judgment. When a person takes
account of the semantics, such as the content of A, or the pragmatics of
the experimental situation, such as trying to find out what the experi-
menter wants to hear, and the resulting inference differs fi-om the logi-
cal norm, then these forms of intelligence are counted as an error in
judgment.
Are logical rules, used in a content-blind way, sound norms? I
do not think so. Let us take the analogy with visual illusions seriously.
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right answer, and therefore has to make an uncertain yet informed bet
hased on cues. One source of uncertainty in the Linda problem is the
polysemy of the terms probable and and. The Oxford English Dictionary and
its equivalents in other languages list various meanings of probable. A
few, such as "what happens frequently," correspond to mathematical
probability, but most, such as "what is plausible" and "whether there is
evidence," do not. Perception solves this problem of underspecification
by intelligent heuristics, and the same seems to be the case for higher-
order cognition. For instance, according to Grice (1989), people rely
on conversational axioms such as relevance. In the present context, the
principle of relevance says that the description of Linda is relevant to
finding the correct answer. Note that if a person treats the term probable
as mathematical probability, then the principle of relevance is violated.
You do not need to read the description of Linda to find the logical
answer—and Gould's homunculus understood this point.
Consider the following version of the Linda problem. Here the poly-
semy of the word probable is eliminated by using the phrase how many:
There are 100 persons who fit the description above (that is,
Linda's). How many of them are:
Bank tellers? t' . •
Bank tellers and active in the feminist movement? '^
This change is sufficient to make the apparently stable cognitive
illusion largely disappear. In one experiment, every single participant
answered that there are more bank tellers {Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999;
for similar results see Fiedler, 1988; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). The
experiment also showed that the majority of participants interpreted
how many in the sense of mathematical probability, but more probable as
meaning "possible," "conceivable," or one of the other nonmathemati-
cal meanings listed in the OED. These results demonstrate intelligent
context-sensitive reasoning {which no computer program can achieve
at this point of time) rather than a rigid, content-blind application of
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the question why children in Geneva made significantly fewer "errors"
than American undergraduates. Inhelder and Piaget asked for how many
rather than the ambiguous probable, and with this clarification, the triv-
iality of the logical problem becomes clear and results become consis-
tent for children and adults.
The same context-sensitivity was found for the cognitive process-
ing of and. Consider this version of the conjunction:
Bank tellers and active feminists.
The conjunction has been rephrased as a noun-plus-noun
phrase. This should not matter from the point of view of logical norms.
However, this noun-noun phrase leads to a substantial number of
violations of the conjunction rule, even when probable is replaced by
how many. This result was reported by Kahneman and Tversky (1996)
to defend the "reality" of the conjunction error. However, the term
and also has no single fixed meaning, and people are equipped with
intelligent heuristics to infer the intended meaning from the seman-
tic context, not only the syntax. Specifically, noun-noun phrases
often refer to the disjunction, not the conjunction, of two elements
or classes. For instance, the announcement "We invited friends and
colleagues" does not refer to the intersection between the two groups,
but to the joint set of both groups. Thus, the extension of the set
friends and colleagues is larger than that of the set friends, which violates
the conjunction rule. But that is not an error of judgment. Consistent
with this analysis, when one replaces the noun-noun phrase by bank
tellers as well as active feminists, which largely eliminates the interpreta-
tion in terms of a disjunction, the so-called conjunction fallacy again
largely disappears (Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 2004; see also Mellers,
Hertwig, and Kahneman, 2001).
' The moral is that human intelligence reaches far beyond
narrow logical norms. In fact, the conjunction problems become triv-
ial and devoid of intellectual challenge when people fmally realize
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was driven home to me long ago when my daughter was 8 years old,
the age Inhelder and Piaget estimated that class inclusion emerges. I
showed her the Primula and Linda problems that I had prepared for
my students.
Q: Are there more flowers or more primulas?
Child: Primulas, but they all are flowers.
Q: (Question repeated).
Child: OK, more flowers. But why do you ask? i
Q.: Is Linda more likely a bank teller or a bank teller
and active in the feminist movement?
Child: If she is in philosophy, she would not be a bank
teller. Therefore, it must be bank teller and active
in the feminist movement. -'
Q.; Why?
Child: Because it is both. One cannot understand these
questions.
Q: Why?
Child: Because they make no sense.
Let me summarize my argument. The use of logic and probabil-
ity theory as a content-blind norm for good reasoning is v^despread
in recent experimental psychology. The Linda problem illustrates this
norm, and how it leads to misinterpreting intelligent semantic and
pragmatic inferences as mental blunders. Even children have a much
more differentiated understanding of language than logic provides;
they rely on conversational axioms, invited inferences, and other forms
of social intelligence (Fillenbaum. 1977; Sweetser, 1990).
What have we learned from some 20 years and hundreds of
experiments on the conjunction fallacy? We have leamed more about
the limits of logic as norms than about the workings of the mind. In
fact, I do not know of any new Insight that this activity has produced.
Logical norms distract us from understanding intelligent behavior.
206 5ocial researchGould should have trusted his homunculus, and psychologists should
trust psychological rather than logical analysis.
Framing
Framing is defined as the expression of logically equivalent infonnation
(whether numerical or verbal) in different ways. You may say that the
glass is half full, or that it is half empty. A physician may tell patients
that they have a 10 percent chance of dying during an operation, or a
90 percent change of surviving. In his classic The Character of Physical
Law, Richard Feynman (1967) emphasized the importance of deriving
different formulations for the same physical law, even if they are math-
ematically equivalent. "Psychologically they are different because they
are completely unequivalent when you are trying to guess new laws"
(53). Feynman used different frames in a positive way to elicit different
thoughts.
In contrast to Feynman's insights, different reactions to logically
equivalent formulations have been declared as normatively inappropri-
ate, suspect of irrational thought. Consider Tversky and Kahneman's
(2000 [1986]) normative principle of invariance: "An essential condition
for a theory of choice that claims normative status is the principle
of invariance: different representations of the same choice problem
should yield the same preference. That is, the preference between
options should be independent of their description" (211).
According to this account, it is normative to ignore whether your
doctor describes the outcome of a possible operation as a 90 percent
chance of survival (positive frame) or a 10 percent chance of dying (nega-
tive frame). It is logically the same (semantics and pragmatics are there-
fore not a topic). But patients more often accept the treatment if doctors
choose a positive frame (Edwards et al., 2001). Kahneman and Tversky
(2000 [1984]) interpret this to mean that people's mental machinery
"is not adequate to perform the task of recoding the two versions . . ,
into a common abstract form" (10). From various demonstrations of
framing effects, they concluded that "in their stubborn appeal, fram-
ing effects resemble perceptual illusions more than computational
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the conjunction rule, framing effects are seen as blunders that should
not happen to a rational person.
Does invariance amount to a general definition of a judgmen-
tal error, as suggested? Feynman's insight contradicts this claim. But
guessing new laws, or scientific discovery, one could argue, may be the
exception to the rule. What about framing in everyday life? Consider
the prototype of all framing stories:
The glass is half full. - u • . •
The glass is half empty. . :
According to the invariance principle, (i) people's choices should
not be affected by the two formulations, and (ii) if they are affected,
then this violates rational choice. Should the description really not
matter? Consider an experiment in which a full glass of water and an
empty glass are put in front of a participant (Sher and McKenzie, 2003).
The experimenter asks the participant to pour half of the full glass into
the other glass, and then asks the participant to hand him the half-
empty glass. Which one does the participant pick? Most people picked
the previously full glass. When they were asked, however, to hand over
the half-full glass, most participants picked the previously empty one.
This experiment reveals that the two statements are not pragmatically
equivalent (see also McKenzie and Nelson, 2003). People extract surplus
infonnation from the framing of the question, and this surplus infor-
mation concems the dynamics or history of the situation, which helps
to guess what is meant. The principle of invariance is content-blind and
cannot "detect" this information.
Invariance and the conjunction rule are two instances of a large
number of logical principles that have been used to define errors of
judgment. Others include consistency, material implication, transi-
tivity, and additivity of probabilities, which 1 will not go into here. It
is sufficient to say that the use of these logical rules as content-blind
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of human intelligence from the defmition of good judgment. These
include abilities that are yet unmatched by today's computer programs,
such as inferring the meaning of polysemous terms from the semantic
context, and decoding information that is given "between the lines."
As a consequence, we have learned next to nothing about the nature of
thinking or other cognitive processes from research on content-blind
norms (Gigerenzer, 1996, 2001). Inappropriate norms are not simply
a normative problem. They tend to suggest wrong questions, and the
answers to these can generate more confusion than insight into the
nature of human judgment.
II. GOOD ERRORS '
Why Do We Forget?
Jorge Louis Borges tells the tale of Ireneo Funes, whom he described
as having been what every man was: he looked without seeing, heard
without listening, and forgot virtually everything. One day Funes was
bucked off a half-tamed horse, knocked unconscious, and left crippled.
But his memory became clear and without limits. He was able to recall
the forms of the clouds in the sky on any day. and reconstruct every
dream. He even reconstructed an entire day, although this itself took
an entire day. He checked his memory against the available facts, and
he found that he never made an error. It irritated him that the dog of
3:14 pm, seen in profile, should be named the same as the one seen a
minute later, frontally. In Funes's world, everything was particular—
which made it difficult for him to think, because to think is to forget,
generalize, and abstract.
Is there a truth in Borges' story? Research on memory suggests
that the answer is yes. Evolution could have produced ideal memories,
and occasionally did so by mistake. The Russian psychologist A. R. Luria
investigated the astounding memory of a man named Shereshevski.
Luria read to him as many as 30 words, numbers, or letters, and asked
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about 7 plus or minus 2. this man recalled all 30. Luria increased to
50, to 70, but Shereshevski recalled all, and then repeated them in
reverse order, too. Luria could not find the limits of this memory.
Some 15 years after their first meeting. Luria asked Shereshevski to
reproduce once again the series of words, numbers, or letters from
that meeting. Shereshevski sat. his eyes closed, paused, and then first
recalled the situation: that they were sitting in Luria's apartment, that
Luria was wearing a gray suit sitting in a rocking chair and was read-
ing the series to him. Then, after all those years, Shereshevski recited
the series precisely from his memory. This was most remarkable at
the time because Shereshevski had become a famous mnemonist who
performed on stage and had been exposed to a massive amount of
infonnation to memorize in each performance, which should have
buried his old memories. • ' ' '-
Is there a cost to such unlimited memory? Shereshevski had
detailed memories of virtually everything that had happened to him.
both the important and the trivial. He could alter his pulse rate from
some 70 to 100 by vividly remembering running after a train that had
just begun to pull out. There was only one thing his brilliant memory
failed to do. It could not forget. It was fiooded by the images of child-
hood, which could cause him acute malaise and chagrin. With a
memory that was composed entirely of details, he was unable to think
on an abstract level. When he read a story, he could recite it word for
word, but when asked to summarize the gist of the same story, he
faltered.
In general, when a task required going beyond the informa-
tion given, such as understanding metaphors, poems, synonyms, and
homonyms. Shereshevski was more or less lost. He complained about
having a poor memory for faces. "People's faces are constantly chang-
ing." he said; "it's the different shades of expression that confuse me and
make it so hard to remember faces" (Ltiria. 1968: 64). Details that other
people would forget occupied his mind, and made it hard to move from
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gist, abstraction, and meaning. Similarly, autistic persons discriminate
more accurately between true and false memories than the nonautis-
tic do, and can have spectacular rote memory abilities. But they also
remember the gist of these events less well (Schacter. 2001:193).
Is perfect memory desirable, without error? The answer seems
to be no. The "sins" of our memory seem to be good errors, that is,
by-products ("spandrels") of a system adapted to the demands of our
environments (Anderson and Schooler, 2000; Hertwig and Todd. 2003;
Kareev. 2000; Schacter. 2001). In this view, forgetting prevents the
sheer mass of details stored in an unlimited memory from critically
slowing down and inhibiting the retrieval of the few important experi-
ences. Too much memory would impair the mind's ability to abstract,
to infer, and to leam. Moreover, the nature of memory is not simply
storing and retrieving. Memory actively "makes up" memories—that is,
it makes inferences and reconstructs the past from the present. This is
in contrast to perception, which also makes uncertain inferences, but
reconstructs the present from the past. Memory needs to be frinctional,
not veridical. To build a system that does not forget will not result in
human intelligence.
Why Cant Players Predict Where a Fly Ball Lands?
How does a baseball player catch a fly ball? It seems that the brain, at an
unconscious level, somehow computes the trajectory of the ball. In The
Selfish Gene, biologist Richard Dawkins writes:
, \
When a man throws a ball high in the air and catches it
again, he behaves as if he had solved a set of differential
equations in predicting the trajectory of the ball. He may
neither know nor care what a differential equation is, but
this does not affect his skill with the ball. At some subcon-
scious level, something functionally equivalent to the
mathematical calculation is going on (1989: 96).
I Think, Therefore I Err 211If players, consciously or unconsciously, calculate the trajectory,
then they should run straight to the point where the ball will hit the
ground, and they should run as fast as they can to allow time to make
final adjustments. However, experimental and observational studies have
shown that experienced players do not live up to these expectations. First,
players sometimes trot rather than nm quickly, and some coaches tend to
scold them because they think they are being lazy. Second, studies with
baseball outfielders showed that they often run toward the ball in an arc
rather than in a straight line (Shaffer et al., 2004). Third, when balls were
shot from vadous angles into the field where players were standing, the
players performed poorly in estimating the location where the ball would
strike the ground (Bablerand Dannemiller, 1993; Saxberg, 1987).
We seem to have identified three errors. These look like strange
blunders, where players need to be educated to improve performance.
But, as in the case of the dots illusion, what if these phenomena are
not errors that need to be corrected, but rather the outcomes of an
intelligent process? This raises the question whether players might
use a heuristic rather than try to estimate the ball's trajectory. Similar
to perceptual illusions, these "errors" can help to unravel the mental
heuristic. Experimental studies have shown that experienced players
actually use several heuristics (e.g.. McLeod and Dienes, 1996; Shaffer
et al.. 2004). One of these is the gaze heuristk, which works in situations
where a ball is already high up in the air:
Fixate on the hall, start running, and adjust your running speed so
that the angle of gaze remains constant.
The angle of gaze is the angle between the eye and the ball, rela-
tive to the ground. A player who uses this heuristic does not need to
measure wind, air resistance, spin, or the other variables that deter-
mine a ball's trajectory. He can get away with ignoring every piece of
causal information. All the relevant information is contained in one
variable: the angle of gaze. Note that a player using the gaze heuristic
212 social researchis not able to compute the point at which the ball will land. But the
heuristic carries the player to the point where the ball lands.
Now we can understand the nature of the three "errors." The
gaze heuristic dictates the speed at which the player runs, and this can
vary from trotting to running as fast as possible. Reduced speed is not
an error in itself; rather, when players try to run at top speed, they
may miss the ball. Similarly, running in a slight arc is not a blunder; it
is a consequence of using strategies similar to the gaze heuristic, and
can also be observed when a dog goes after a fiying Frisbee—the dog
runs so that the image of the disc is kept moving along a straight line
(Shaffer et al., 2004). And finally, the player does not need to be able to
compute where the ball lands; the heuristic solves the problem without
that knowledge. The first two "errors" are indispensable to good perfor-
mance: always running as fast as possible and in a straight line would
instead prevent one from using an efficient heuristic. The third "error"
has a different quality; it refers to a complex ability that the simple
heuristic does not need for solving the problem.
Every Intelligent System Makes Errors
I have dealt, by means of examples, with a deep normative controversy
in the cognitive and sodal sciences. Two visions are in conflict with one
another. The first always takes errors as negative, as nuisances: the fewer
one makes, the better. This negative view is implied by the reliance on
logical principles for a general definition of rational behavior. I have
argued that these "content-blind" norms fail to provide a reasonable defi-
nition of error, and are inapt tools for um-aveling the laws of the mind.
In the second view, alongside blunders of inattention and the like, there
also exist good errors. A good error is a consequence of the adaptation of
mental heuristics to the structure of environments. This ecological view
is illustrated by visual illusions. Not making good errors would destroy
human intelligence. What is correct or erroneous is no longer defined by
a syntactic principle, but rather by the success of the heuristic in the real
world. Good errors can provide insights into the workings of the mind.
I Think, Therefore I Err 213Descartes coined the dictum "I think, therefore I am" as a first
step in demonstrating the attainability of certain knowledge. In an
uncertain world, however, thinking as well as elementary perception
involve making bets and taking risks. To err is not only human but is
a necessary consequence of this kind of intelligence. I hope Descartes
will not mind a modification of his dictum accordingly: I think, there
fore 1 err. Whenever I err, I know intuitively that I am.
NOTES
I am grateful for helpful comments by Thalia Gigerenzer, Ralph Hertwig,
Lael Schooler, and Peter Todd.
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